New Winners and Old Losers. A Priori Voting Power in the EU25. ZEI Discussion Papers C. 149, 2005 by Wiberg, Matti.
New Winners
and Old Losers
A Priori Voting Power
in the EU25
Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung
Center for European Integration Studies
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn
Matti Wiberg
C149
2005
D
i
s
c
u
s
s
i
o
n
P
a
p
e
r
Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung
Center for European Integration Studies
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn
Walter-Flex-Straße 3
D-53113 Bonn
Germany
Tel.:
Fax:
http:
+49-228-73-4952
+49-228-73-1788
//www.zei.de
ISSN 1435-3288 ISBN 3-936183-49-X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Matti Wiberg is Professor of Political Science at the University of 
Turku, Finland, a Senior Fellow at the Center for European Integrati-
on Studies since 2000 and a Member of the Finnish Academy of 
Science and Letters since 2003. 
He has published eleven monographs, edited 13 books and publis-
hed more than 170 chapters and articles in books and scholarly jour-
nals. 
He is also functioning as a Member of the Board of the Finnish Politi-
cal Science Association as well as a Member of the Board of the 
Nordic Political Science Association. Wiberg is also the Convener for 
The European Consortium for Political Research Standing Group on 
Parliaments and Local Director of Good Governance Consortium. 
 Matti Wiberg 
New Winners and Old Losers 
A Priori Voting Power in the EU25 
Introduction 
Analysis of the development of power distributions is one of the core tasks 
of political science. How much do the EU member states have a priori vot-
ing power in the Council of Ministers? In particular, what have the modifi-
cations in the voting weights after the various enlargements meant for the 
distribution of a priori voting power in the Council? We will in the follow-
ing use the standardized Penrose-Banzhaf-index when analyzing the distri-
bution of power among member-states (Banzhaf 1965 and Penrose 1946) 
(cf. Raunio and Wiberg 1998 and 2002). 
A few words on the method for evaluation voting power are in order. Any 
voting system can be identified with the corresponding set of winning coa-
litions, i.e. those collections of voters sufficient to guarantee the passage of 
a decision, such as a bill in a parliament. The power of an actor in voting 
bodies is best conceptualized as and measured by that actor’s control over 
voting outcomes. The more an actor controls voting outcomes, the more 
voting power that actor has. Control over outcomes depends crucially on 
how frequently one can pool one’s votes with those of others to ensure that 
an outcome is favorable to oneself. 
The Council of Ministers makes her decisions with majority rule. In these 
votings the member states have a fixed set of votes at their disposal (Table 
1). Matti Wiberg 
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Table 1: Development of the Distribution of Votes in the Council. 
Country EEC6 
1957- 
EEC9 
1973- 
EEC10 
1981- 
EEC12 
1986- 
EU15 
1995- 
EU25 
1.5.-
31.10 
2004 
EU25 
1.11. 
2004- 
Belgium  2 5 5 5 5 5 12 
France 4  10 10 10 10 10 29 
Germany  4  10 10 10 10 10 29 
Italy  4  10 10 10 10 10 29 
Luxembourg  1 2 2 2 2 2 4 
Netherlands  2 5 5 5 5 5 13 
Denmark    3 3 3 5 3 7 
Ireland    3 3 3 3 3 7 
UK    10 10 10 10 10 29 
Greece      5 5 5 5 12 
Portugal     5  5  5  12 
Spain     8  8  8  27 
Austria      4  4  10 
Finland      3  3  7 
Sweden      4  3  10 
Poland       8  27 
Czech  Rep.       5  12 
Hungary       5  12 
Slovakia       3  7 
Lithuania       3  7 
Latvia       3  4 
Slovenia       3  4 
Estonia       3  4 
Cyprus       2  4 
Malta       2  3 
Qualified 
Majority 
12/17 41/58 45/63 54/76 62/87 88/124  232/321 
(%)  70,59 70,69 71,43 71,05 71,26 70,97 72,27 
Blocking 
Minority 
6  18 19 23 26 37 90 
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In voting games it is assumed that there are only two kinds of coalitions: 
losing ones and winning ones. The voting power indices measure the ac-
tors’ power in an abstract sense, i.e. they analyze the properties of the vot-
ing body rather than the actual game played in it. Power indices are thus 
based on a priori considerations: they do not reflect the actors’ real possi-
bilities in influencing the outcome in shaping the agenda (introduction of 
alternatives, decision of the voting order, and other forms of agenda ma-
nipulation), but focus upon their probability of influencing the outcome of 
voting when the number of votes every actor has and the decision rule are 
taken into account. Since in the institutions where voting takes place, the 
voters change and one cannot know the issues to be voted in the future, the 
probabilistic approach offered by the power indices is an effective and in-
formative tool for analyzing the power of the voters and their coalitions. 
Power indices have been normalized for reasons of comparability so that 
they range from 0 to 1. An actor with no voting power at all (index value = 
0) is called a dummy. 
The Measure 
There is a vast literature on various voting power indices. In this paper we 
apply the Penrose-Banzhaf-index for simplicity. A few words of clarifica-
tion on this index are in order. 
The Penrose-Banzhaf-index (B) is based on a coalition concept and focuses 
upon the swing, critical or pivotal voter, whose input in votes makes a los-
ing coalition into a winning one. The Penrose-Banzhaf-index of a voter is 
the number of winning coalitions in which her defection from the coalition 
would render it losing – which is also called a critical defection – divided 
by the total number of critical defections for all voters. The Penrose-
Banzhaf-index simply counts the number of coalitions in which an actor i is 
a swing voter. Briefly, if C is a winning coalition under a given decision 
rule d with actor i ∈ C, then i swings if C - {i} is losing, that is, if the same 
coalition without i would be losing. The Penrose-Banzhaf-index of a party 
group equals the contribution of that group to all possible coalitions divided 
by the sum of contributions of all party groups to all coalitions. Stated oth-Matti Wiberg 
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erwise, player i’s Penrose-Banzhaf-index is defined as the number of 
swings for voter i divided by the total number of coalitions containing voter 
i. A swing occurs when the defection of voter i changes a coalition from 
winning to losing. When using the Penrose-Banzhaf-index it is assumed 
that all coalitions are equally probable. 
The Results 
Let’s start with taking a look at the historical development of the distribu-
tion of a priori voting power in the Council of Ministers
1. 
Table 2: Distribution of Standardized Penrose-Banzhaf-Voting Power in the Council. 
Country EEC6 
1957- 
EEC9 
1973- 
EEC10 
1981- 
EEC12 
1986- 
EU15 
1995- 
EU25 
1.5.-31.10.2004 
EU25 
1.11.2004- 
Belgium  .1429 .0915 .0820 .0666 .0587 .0420  .0391 
France  .2381 .1672 .1577 .1287 .1116 .0765  .0857 
Germany  .2381 .1672 .1577 .1287 .1116 .0765  .0857 
Italy  .2381 .1672 .1577 .1287 .1116 .0765  .0857 
Luxembourg  dummy  .0158 .0410 .0180 .0226 .0172  .0132 
Netherlands  .1429 .0915 .0820 .0666 .0587 .0420  .0423 
Denmark    .0662 .0410 .0459 .0359 .0255  .0231 
Ireland    .0662 .0410 .0459 .0359 .0255  .0231 
UK    .1672 .1577 .1287 .1116 .0765  .0857 
Greece     .0820  .0666  .0587 .0420 .0391 
Portugal       .0666  .0587  .0420  .0391 
Spain       .1089  .0924  .0641  .0813 
Austria         .0479  .0329 .0327 
Finland         .0359  .0255  .0231 
Sweden         .0479  .0255  .0327 
Poland       .0641  .0813 
Czech  Rep.       .0420  .0391 
Hungary       .0420  .0391 
Slovakia       .0255  .0231 
Lithuania       .0255  .0231 
Latvia       .0255  .0132 
Slovenia       .0255  .0132 
Estonia       .0255  .0132 
Cyprus       .0172  .0132 
Malta       .0172  .0099 
 
1 All voting power computations in this paper were made by the software Power 1.4, 
designed by Ph D Candidate Tommi Meskanen (Department of Mathematics, Uni-
versity of Turku, Finland). New Winners and Old Losers 
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Figure 1: Distribution of a priori voting power in EU25. 
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There are no strong countries: all are weak, but some weaker than others. It 
is noteworthy that even the strongest players have less than one tenth of the 
a priori voting power. On the other hand, some players are next to dum-
mies. Malta with her less than one percent of a priori voting power is the 
weakest country. 
Having established the current distribution of a priori voting power, we 
now turn to take a closer look at the differences in the voting power before 
and after the most recent enlargements. We start with the changes between 
EU15 and the current situation. 
 
 
 
 Matti Wiberg 
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Table 3: Differences in a priori voting power EU15 vs. EU25 (1.11.2004-). 
Country  EU15 1995-  EU25 1.11.2004-  Difference  Difference (%) 
Belgium .0587  .0391  -.0196  -33,4 
France .1116  .0857  -.0259  -23,2 
Germany .1116  .0857  -.0259  -23,2 
Italy .1116  .0857  -.0259  -23,2 
Luxembourg .0226  .0132  -.0094  -41,6 
Netherlands .0587  .0423  -.0164  -27,9 
Denmark .0359  .0231  -.0128  -35,7 
Ireland .0359  .0231  -.0128  -35,7 
United Kingdom  .1116  .0857  -.0259  -23,2 
Greece .0587  .0391  -.0196 -33,4 
Portugal .0587  .0391  -.0196  -33,4 
Spain .0924  .0813  -.0111  -12,0 
Austria .0479  .0327  -.0152  -31,7 
Finland .0359  .0231  -.0128  -35,7 
Sweden .0479  .0327  -.0152  -31,7 
Poland    .0813 .0813  
Czech  Republic   .0391 .0391  
Hungary    .0391 .0391  
Slovakia    .0231 .0231  
Lithuania    .0231 .0231  
Latvia    .0132 .0132  
Slovenia    .0132 .0132  
Estonia    .0132 .0132  
Cyprus    .0132 .0132  
Malta    .0099 .0099  
 
Figure 2: Differences in a priori voting power EU15 vs. EU25 (1.11.2004-). 
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Figure 2 shows that every old member state loses power compared to the 
EU15-situation. In other words: Every old EU-member state loses apriori 
voting power, but some more than others. 
Let us now proceed with a look at the differences that has occurred during 
last year, when the weights were modified starting 1
st of November. 
 
Table 4: Differences in a priori voting power 1.5.2004 – 31.10.2004 EU25 vs. 
1.11.2004- EU25. 
Country EU25  1.5.-
31.10.2004 
EU25 
1.11.2004- 
 
Difference Difference  (%) 
Belgium .042  .0391  -.0029  -6,9 
France  .0765 .0857  .0092 12,0 
Germany  .0765 .0857  .0092 12,0 
Italy  .0765 .0857  .0092 12,0 
Luxembourg .0172 .0132  -.0040  -23,3 
Netherlands .042 .0423  .0003  0,7 
Denmark .0255  .0231  -.0024  -9,4 
Ireland .0255  .0231  -.0024  -9,4 
United  Kingdom  .0765 .0857  .0092 12,0 
Greece .042  .0391  -.0029  -6,9 
Portugal .042  .0391  -.0029  -6,9 
Spain  .0641 .0813  .0172 26,8 
Austria .0329  .0327  -.0002  -0,6 
Finland .0255  .0231  -.0024  -9,4 
Sweden  .0255 .0327  .0072 28,2 
Poland  .0641 .0813  .0172 26,8 
Czech Republic  .042  .0391  -.0029  -6,9 
Hungary .042  .0391  -.0029  -6,9 
Slovakia .0255  .0231  -.0024  -9,4 
Lithuania .0255  .0231  -.0024  -9,4 
Latvia .0255  .0132  -.0123  -48,2 
Slovenia .0255  .0132  -.0123  -48,2 
Estonia .0255  .0132  -.0123  -48,2 
Cyprus .0172  .0132  -.0040  -23,3 
Malta .0172  .0099  -.0073  -42,4 
 Matti Wiberg 
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Figure 3: Differences in a priori voting power 1.5.2004 – 31.10.2004 EU25 vs. 
1.11.2004- EU25. 
Difference (%)
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The results are mixed: some lose, but some also win, quite remarkably. Es-
pecially the large countries win as compared to the previous situation. And 
they win by no means modestly. Some smaller countries win, too. The new 
member states, bar Poland, loose. 
Winners are: Sweden, Spain, Poland, France, Germany, Italy, UK, Nether-
lands.   
Losers are:  Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia, Malta, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Den-
mark, Finland, Ireland, Lithuania, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Greece, Hun-
gary, Portugal, Belgium, Austria. 
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Practical and Political Consequences 
What are the most important practical and political consequences of these 
calculations? 
First a word of whether these kinds of calculations will have any practical 
impact at all. It has been known for quite some time that for instance the 
contradictory notions of majority requirements in the Nice Treaty were 
overseen in the heat of the debate – they should not have been. 
There was a problem with respect to the votes needed for qualified majority 
and blocking minority caused by the contradictory declarations annexed to 
the Treaty of Nice. According to the declaration 20, the qualified majority 
constitutes of “at least 258 votes in favor”, but in the declaration 21, the 
blocking minority is regulated to consist of “91 votes”. This latter figure 
would imply that only 255 votes in favor would constitute the qualified ma-
jority (345-90 = 255). This contradiction was engineered in the post-Nice –
negotiations, but without a satisfactory result. The Coreper decided in Feb-
ruary 2001 that the latter declaration should be taken as the starting point 
for solving this problem. The Danish Presidency drafted various alterna-
tives during the latter half of the 2002, and finally the convention decided 
that the qualified majority is 232, the blocking minority is thus 90. 
It took many weeks of delicate diplomatic negotiating to sort this out. It 
should not have occurred in the first place – and it tells something about the 
trivial algebraic competencies of the delegations that The contradiction 
passed into the text without anyone noticing the contradictions. 
Here any political scientist worth his diploma would have been most help-
ful. This would namely have been one of the first regulations a political 
scientist would look into given a new text. Distribution of power is at the 
very core interest of political science. Consequently political scientists are 
very keen in analyzing various coalitional possibilities. The opportunities 
to form winning coalitions is one way of describing the distribution of 
power within a political institution. When fragmentation increases, decision 
making get more difficult. Matti Wiberg 
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There is more to governance than arithmetic, though. Politics, even Euro-
pean integration is a matter of people. Even with the enlargement, much 
will remain the same. In the words of one witty UK minister in his diary for 
18 February 1986: 
“Not, really, that it makes the slightest difference to the conclusions of a meeting what 
Ministers say at it [Council of Ministers]. Everything is decided, horse-traded off, by 
officials at COREPER, the Council of Permanent Representatives. The Ministers arrive 
on the scene at the last minute, hot, tired, ill, or drunk (sometimes all of these together), 
read out their piece, and depart. 
Strange, really. Because the EC constitution is quite well drawn. The Council of Minis-
ters is sovereign, and can/could boss COREPER around. 
But, as always in politics, democratic or autocratic, it’s the chaps on the spot who call 
the shot. 
Now what I should have done – what every Minister should have been doing is – after 
the ‘Conference’, to call the officials in, get fully briefed on the next subjects to come 
before COREPER, and instruct them on their ‘Line to Take’. So that, in good time, the 
Minister would know what was happening, what had been conceded, what was still 
open to play for.” (Clark 1993, 139) 
There is little hope that this will change during our lifetime. The EU policy 
process is strengthening the executive branch in all national political sys-
tems, but also in the EU itself. The role and power of the Eurocrats will in-
crease in many ways. National parliaments will not be able to cope, i.e. 
steer and control the integration process with the pressed schedules and 
widening informational asymmetries. Parliaments can in the best of all con-
stellations react, but they have little or no hope of being genuinely pro-
active with respect to integration goal-setting or achievement evaluation. 
In all honesty: it is not probable that these calculations will have any sig-
nificant impact on the behavior of any of the relevant players within the 
EU-machinery. The true decision-makers within the EU-governance do not 
base their strategic moves on these kinds of a priori calculations, but rather 
on some other forms of pragmatic considerations. It is then another matter 
whether they should get themselves familiar with the current research re-
sults in the field. There is not much hope that this advancement of techni-
cal-scientific expertise would grow fast in the relevant policy planning New Winners and Old Losers 
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quarters in the capitals of the member states. In the words of one senior 
diplomat after having taken part in a briefing covering some of the func-
tionally equivalent of a priori voting power calculations: these calculations 
are a form of academic perversion that does not reflect political realities all 
too well. It is still to be hoped for that even basic research results would get 
the credit they deserve even from pragmatic authorities. 
It is a well-established fact that voting does not occur often in the Council 
of Ministers. Somehow it is an indication of policy failure, if the Council 
has voted.  
Why is it the case that the Council votes only rarely? Some explanations 
can be given. First of all the nature of the processing of issues within the 
Council leads to the non-occurrence of voting as all member states have 
had their opportunity to modify the issue according to their wishes even 
before the issue is finally formally decided upon. 
The voting statistics should also be read with the context in mind. It is 
rather the rule than exception that Council decision making is not done on 
the basis of issues isolated from each others. All kinds of issues are pack-
aged together. 
Logrolling of many kinds takes place. Some of the deals are only implicit. 
For outsiders, such as the research community, such political deals are hard 
to pin down. Sometimes the relevant players even refuse to admit their ex-
istence. To demonstrate their existence is not an easy task. 
The current battle between federalists and their opponents will continue. 
Eventual new coalition patterns will emerge. The enlargement process has 
enhanced at least the following cleavages: 
Old vs. new members 
Large vs. small states 
Rich vs. poor 
The old members will perhaps think that the new members will lower the 
tone, and that they are after the old member’s money. Old members will, of 
course, put up a show of bonhomie, but this does hide the fact that some of Matti Wiberg 
14   
the old member’s have never been keen on letting ten new countries in. The 
new countries are a bit worried that the rest secretly look down on them. 
And of course they do. Voters fear their small states might be swamped by 
the Union – or by the big member states. 
It is a safe bet that the European demos will not be enthusiastic about 
enlargement – to the extent that one even exists. The populations in the 
member states remain intellectually and otherwise uncurious of any aspect 
of the EU. Interest in integration is low and EP elections do not mobilize 
voters. Turnout will remain low. 
The accession countries seem interested mainly in getting their share of 
Europe’s most wasteful practice, which devotes half (over € 40 billion a 
year) the EU budget to support mostly unproductive farmers. There is little 
hope in reforming completely the Common Agricultural Policy. The CAP 
is not only about saving the countryside: 80 % of the EU’s farm subsidies 
go to the 20 % of the union’s farmers with the biggest farms. Because EU 
subsidies are linked to production, they encourage intensive, industrial 
farming. The commission’s current proposal would cut the link between 
farm subsidies and production. The same sum would continue to pour into 
the European countryside, but increasingly be directed towards environ-
mental protection and rural development, and away from intensive farming. 
Where does this lead? The great European family could be looking seri-
ously dysfunctional. The union is not linearly deepening integration on all 
fronts simultaneously. 
Also unexpected alliances are emerging. European diplomacy will be more 
complex. There will be several orchestras with bilateral, trilateral and quad-
rilateral alliances on different issues. 
There are many ways to improve the way the EU is run. Not only is it im-
portant what the constitution explicitly contains. It is also important what it 
does not even implicitly contain. 
Designing the future EU is not an easy task: one have to reconcile the in-
terests of big states and small, of rich and poor, of nation states and inte-
grated institutions. Whatever solution has been settled, it will not be per-New Winners and Old Losers 
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manent. There is no such thing as an end result in constitutional engineer-
ing. The dangers of making the entire system more complicated or less de-
mocratically accountable – or both – are evident. The big ones, especially 
the UK and France, tend, in reality, but perhaps not always in their rhetoric, 
to see strong EU institutions as a threat to their national sovereignty. 
The wrangle over who does what within the EU institutions is stirring great 
controversy. Getting the balance right, or at least acceptable, is complex 
because the EU’s hybrid nature as a union of states and of peoples. 
At the end of the day, there will always be more of those who are more in-
terested in deal-making than declarations. Whatever comes out of these 
deals must inevitably bear the marks of messy compromise but generally 
deserve support. 
The most important question of all: how to keep these increasingly com-
plex institutions under democratic control? The convention was not particu-
larly keen on adding real and effective transparency to the EU-machinery. 
On this score, it seems to have got its priorities wrong. Democratic ac-
countability has never been one of the EU’s strong sides. Little in this re-
spect is going to change in the near future. 
It is typical for EU-reforms that they start with grandiose hopes for 
Europe’s future – and produce results that are watered down compromises 
all can live with. The end result is not as far going as the hard core integra-
tionists would like it to be – and not so far going as the Eurosceptics fear. 
There has always been space in the EU for both ultra-visionary architecture 
and down to earth pragmatism. The Inter-governmental conference after 
the convention was, as they usually have been, end up in a drawn-out nego-
tiation and hasty decisions in the final 24 hours. There has always been a 
workable set of proposals that can command enough of general support. 
The most ardent centralisers will be disappointed – and the Eurosceptics 
will still react with shock. This has been so for many years. Hardly any-
thing suggests that the union will not resort to its long-standing method of 
back-room deals during its future developments. 
 Matti Wiberg 
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Enlargement will bring about many new opportunities. The markets are 
growing eastwards. The union will comprise more individuals than ever. 
Enlargement will not only produce opportunities. New threats are also 
emerging. Crime from the east is one of the deep fears of the citizens of the 
old member states. 
Prejudices will prevail for a long time. It will take quite some time before 
the Dutch realize that all the Poles are not so conservative as they believe 
them to be, and that all the Dutch will not be as wildly liberal as many of 
the Poles seem to think. There is premarital sex in Poland – and an ordinary 
Dutch does not spend his time high on heroin killing sick grandmothers in 
their beds (euthanasia) or unborn children (abortion) on a monthly basis. 
It would be unwise to take assurances at face value that the Union has no 
plans to extend its powers. After all, plans can change; few people would 
sign a contract letting their neighbors demolish their house, based on an 
oral assurance that they had no such intention. New constellations, new 
plans. 
As long as there is no clear division of labor among the union institutions 
and member states will the EU appear to the common man and woman as 
an incomprehensible mess, where the feeling of individual political help-
lessness enhances. As individuals we are tempted to throw in the towel and 
say: we don’t understand this and for this reason we will turn our backs to 
the EU. 
The range of opinions in the EU is so wide that many governments are 
bound to object to bits of the constitution. 
Even if governments do unite around the convention’s proposals, there is 
still another hurdle: to win the popular assent. History suggests that plans 
for tighter European integration stand a good chance of being rejected if 
people are actually asked their opinion. But it is not just unexpected events 
in the world that can derail constitutional conventions. There is also a 
chance that delegates will simply fail to agree – or fail to sell the agreed 
proposal to the public. In the present circumstances, both risks are fairly New Winners and Old Losers 
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high. Already eight countries have decided to have a referendum over the 
constitution. Nobody can guarantee a positive outcome. 
There will be new initiatives by some more enthusiastic federalists to create 
a core of countries to push forward European integration. These proposals 
will be seen as signs of new pushes towards developing a multi-speed 
Europe. The principle of creating pioneer groups of EU members in certain 
policy areas is gaining ground in member states. An increasing number of 
countries must be expected to support moves to allow member states to 
forge ahead in certain policy fields to stop an enlarged union of 25 or more 
countries grinding to a halt. 
A guarantee that countries can choose whether to take part in some contro-
versial aspects of EU integration may also make it easier to persuade skep-
tical member states to ratify the new constitution: countries can more than 
before pick the areas in which they want to become active. Coalitions of 
the willing will emerge around various policy fields. Active participation in 
one field does not necessitate participation in some other field. Some coun-
tries, notably Britain, originally an advocate of a multi-speed Europe, is 
concerned if the concept led to the fragmentation of the EU into two blocs, 
with an inner hard core, led by France and Germany embarking on more 
integration across a wide front. The principle of enhanced co-operation was 
written into the Amsterdam Treaty but it has not been applied since it came 
into force in May 1999. 
However, there are already essential examples of EU core groups forming 
in key policy areas under different mechanisms, notably with the 12 mem-
ber states using the single currency and in the passport-free Schengen travel 
area. Although the most enthusiastic federalists consider a multi-speed 
Europe second best, it is inevitable in an enlarged union. With 25 countries 
there will be different degrees on integration, so that the avant-garde does 
not have to wait for the slowest. The risk is that the EU would be able to 
speak with a less united vote. 
Far too little thought has been given to the legal and economic ramifica-
tions of the grand constitutional proclamations. The creation of European 
citizenship, for instance, together with the prohibition of discrimination on Matti Wiberg 
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the basis of national citizenship. Both were implicit in the earlier treaties 
and are central to the European idea: Europeans have joined together and 
should not discriminate against each other. But the new constitution would 
give these principles the status of constitutional law. If applied to other 
rights enumerated in the constitution, they could create social harmonisa-
tion by the back door. This would not be without consequences for the 
European economy. Under the current principle of inclusion, an EU citizen 
who moves from one EU country to another to work is immediately and 
fully integrated into the social system of the host country. Those who mi-
grate for reasons other than employment receive no welfare benefits apart 
from emergency health care. However, the new constitution could mean 
that the inclusion principle would apply to all migrants from EU countries, 
including those who do not come to work. This is not explicitly stated, but 
the courts would probably interpret the concept of social inclusion more 
generously than they do already. If having work is no longer required be-
fore a migrant can benefit from the welfare state, some fear that the flood-
gates will be opened: masses of refugees would flow from eastern Europe 
to seek their fortune. To prevent this chaos, EU migrants should have to 
wait for full welfare benefits, such as rent subsidies and public housing, 
while enjoying access to public services and other benefits they pay for via 
taxes and social insurance contributions. If differential treatment is not al-
lowed, countries will be forced to compete to trim welfare benefits so that 
they are no more attractive as destinations than their neighbors. Welfare 
states would not survive. Harmonization of social standards could prevent a 
downward spiral. But economic conditions are far too varied for this to 
work. 
But there are other realities bearing in on the EU from the outside. The un-
ion’s most urgent need is to piece together the common foreign and secu-
rity policy it has claimed to have. Success can hardly be guaranteed. But 
without the added coherence offered by meaningful reforms, the union is 
more likely to fail. 
Some members of the EU are suffering from “enlargement fatigue” and 
want to slow down the process. The logic of the events themselves will not 
fulfill this wishful thinking. There are, particularly in Germany, those who New Winners and Old Losers 
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still think that the inclusion of the post-communist countries into the EU 
pose a Trojan donkey –kind of threat. The New, post-communist converts 
to the American ideal, may split Europe, they claim. 
In the convention especially the small states suffered, according to the Fin-
nish foreign minister Erkki Tuomioja (sd), from the Stockholm syndrome, 
i.e. the psychological state in which the victims of a kidnapping, or persons 
detained against their free will – prisoners – develop a relationship with 
their captor(s). (The syndrome has been named this way after the famous 
bank robbery of Kreditbanken, Stockholm which lasted from August 23 to 
August 28, 1973: the victims kept on defending their captors even after 
their six days physical detention was over. They showed a reticent behav-
iour in the following legal procedures too.)  After having been frightened 
will all kinds of bad things and further going solutions, the representatives 
of the small countries were relieved that some of the not-welcomed 
changes were successfully rejected – and halted their criticism. Isolation 
from perspectives other than those of the leader of the convention made 
many to give up their resistance; and the convention succeeded in produc-
ing a consensus document. 
Many parts of the non-governmental sector will be influenced by enlarge-
ment. Not only trade unions and other interest organizations will find a new 
need to coordinate their interest activities. Also other civil organizations 
will try to get more connected to their European sister and brother organi-
zations. Ties will be closer and a huge harmonization process will take 
place.  
Parties. European parties will become more important. With so many new 
players there is a strongly felt need for aggregating decision making to 
some manageable level. Parties are the glue that keeps the acts together. 
With near identical ideological goals the parties will be able to produce – 
There is, however, one big reservation to this: the parties must have re-
sources, above all intellectual resources to constantly feed the decision 
making process with new initiatives, reform packages, broad visions. It is 
not self-evident that the current parties will have there resources – nor that 
they will get them in the near future. Matti Wiberg 
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EU membership and the process of European integration consolidate cen-
tralization of power and top-down decision-making, through providing 
party leadership (as cabinet members) with an arena (EU) where the party 
organization exercises little if any control over party representatives. The 
logic behind the argument is simple and rest on informational asymmetries 
resulting from the uneven participatory rights of national politicians in the 
EU political system. European integration strengthenens leadership auton-
omy, a process already under way independently of integration. The result 
is increasingly centralized party, defined as one that features the concentra-
tion of effective decision-making authority in the national party organs, 
with a premium placed on a smaller number of individuals participating in 
the decision. Centralization is reinforced by exogenous, cross-national fac-
tors – the political dynamics of the EU policy process. 
Through their regular participation in the Council and the European Coun-
cil, the leading party figures as ministers gain access to a decision-making 
arena where the rest of the national party exerts little if any control. While 
electoral considerations naturally limit the autonomy of party leaders, they 
nevertheless possess considerable discretion to make agreements at the 
European level. European integration will weaken links between national 
parties and interest groups, firstly because an increasing number of impor-
tant policy decisions are taken at the European level either by the Council 
or the Commission, and secondly because EU directives and competition 
rules set limits to patronage.  
As ever, much will depend on the economy. The outlook for Europe’s 
economy is hardly optimistic: growth is slow and the troubles are huge – 
and increasing not least due to the ageing of the populations. 
The two negative outcomes in the referenda on the constitutional treaty in 
France and The Netherlands will undoubtedly slow down integration. The 
To predict the future would be foolish. EU must take a pause for considera-
tion. Maybe that’s in the end good for Europe and its citizens. 
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